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[Crim. No. 12350.

In Bank.

Dec. 12, 1968.]

In re WILJJIAM Z. CUJ.JVER on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Escape-By Arrestee.-A person who has been arrested for a
felony and escapes before being taken to a jail or other place
of confinement is not a "prisoner charged with a felony"
who "escapes" within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 4532, subd.
(b), providing among other things that every prisoner charged
with or convicted of a felony who escapes from the custody
of any officer in whose lawful custody he is is guilty of a
felony.
[2] Id. - 01fense as Statutory. - The legislative history of Pen.
Code, § 4532, subd. (b), and the related provision of subd. (a),
indicates that the section applies only to persons incarcerated in jails or other institutions of confinement who escape
therefrom or such persons who escape from the custody of
those to whom they haye been entrusted while temporarily
outside such places of confinement.
[3] Id.-By Arrestee.-Pen. Code, § 4532, proscribing escapes, does·
not apply until an arrestee has been booked preparatory to
incarceration in a jail or other place of confinement and there-

[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescu4i, § 2
et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescue, § 6 et seq.
McX. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Escape and Rescue, § 1; [2]
Escape and Rescue, § 2.
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purposc of according to COllSlIllIl'rS who are parties to sucll
contracts the full protection of the salutary statutc. We must
particularly avoid the emasculatioll of section 1812.7 by a too
rcady acceptance of thc cxcuse of a financc company that it
lacked the "knowledge" rcquired by that section. Accordingly, we hold that thc srdion l'cquires only the holder's
constructive knowledgc; it docs not sanction any unsupportable claim of "innocencc. "
That part of the judgment which provides that the holder
of the contract is cntitled to collect the time price differential
accruing after June 2, 1966, is reversed. In all other respects
the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs-appellants shall recover
costs on appeal.
Traynor, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J. concurred.

[Crim. No. 12350.

In Bank. Dec. 12, 1968.]

In re WILTJIAM Z. CUINER on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Escape-By Arrestee.-A person who has been arrested for a
felony and escapes before being taken to a jail or other place
of . confinement is not a "prisoner charged with a felony"
who "escapes" within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 4532, subd.
(b), providing among other things that every prisoner charged
with or convicted of a felony who escapes from the custody
of any officer in whose lawful custody he is is guilty of a
felony.
[2] Id. - OBense as Statutory. - The legislative history of Pen.
Code, § 4532, subd. (b), and the related provision of subd. (a),
indicates that the section applies only to persons incarcerated in jails or other institutions of confinement who escape
therefrom or such persons who escape from the custody of
those to whom they have been entrusted while temporarily
outside such places of confinement.
[3] Id.-By Arrestee.-Pcn. Code, § 4532, proscribing escapes, does
not apply until an arrestee has been booked preparatory to
incarceration in a jail or other place of confinement and there-

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescue, § 2
et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescue, § 6 et seq.
McX. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Escape and Rescue, § 1; [2]
Escape .and Rescue, § 2.
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by becomes a prisoner withiu its meaning. (Disapproving
People v. Smillie, 55 Cal.App.2d 381 [130 P.2<i 714], People \',
McConahay, 90 Cal.App.2d 596 [203 P.2d 791], People v. Darnell, 107 Cal.App.2d 541 [237 P.2d 525], People ,'. Segum,
134 Cal.App.2d 532 [286 P.2d 471], People v. Paul, 147 Cal.
App.2d 609 [305 P.2d 996], People v. Torres, ]53 Cul.App.2d
636 [313 P.2d 197], and People v. Valenzuela, 171 Cal.App.2d
331 [340 P.2d 685] insofar as inconsistent herewith.)
[4] Id.-From Arresting Officer.-It was not uureasonable for the
Legislature to conclude that Pen. Code, § 148, proscribing resisting public officers in the discharge of their duties, and
other statutes that protect officers in the performance of their
duties, are sufficient to cope with the problem of escapes from
arresting officers, and thut an arrestee who has not yet been
incarcerated and who may have done no more than walk away
from an arresting officer should not be declared guilty of the
felony of escape.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from custody. Writ granted.
Lin B. Densmore for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant Attorney General, and Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Deputy
Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In this habeas corpus proeeeding, petitioner attacks his conviction of violating Penal Code section
4532, subdivision (b), escape from custody, on the groullfl
that the undisputed facts establish that the statute did not
prohibit llis conduct. (See In rc Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 666,
668 [36 Cal.Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182, 10 A.L.R.3d 840].)
On the evening of August 11, 1961, a deputy sheriiT
received a call in llis patrol car stating that a person of petitioner's description had struck another person with a pool
cue during a poolroom fight and was wanted by the authorities. Shortly thereafter the officer saw petitioner runnin~
across a field, apprehended him, and placed him under arrest.
Petitioner struggled with the officer and fled. A t that time no
charges had been filed against 11im. Within an 110ur petitioner
was again apprehelHled and taken into custody. At the time of
the initial arrest the arrt'sting officer had neither an arrest
warrant nor reason to believe that a crime had been eOlllmitted in his presence. He was therefore required, if he was to
arrest petitioner at all, to arrest him for the commission of a
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felony. (Pen. Code, § 836.) The felony for which petitioner
was arrested was assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code,
§ 245.) Subsequently, petitioner was formally chllrw'd with
battery, a misdemeanol· (Pen. Coue, § 242) und, uftl'I' 11 jUl'Y
trial, was acquitted.
Shortly before his acquittal, petitioner was chargeu with
and convicted of a violation of section 4532, subdivision (b),
based upon his flight from the arresting officer immediately
after his arrest.
[1] At the time of petitioner's escape, section 4532, subdivision (b), provided that "Every prisoner charged with or
convicted of a felony . . . who escapes . . . from the custody
of any officer . . . in whose lawful custody he is, is guilty of a
felony . . . . "1 The crucial question is whether a person who
has been arrested for a felony and escapes before being taken
to a jailor-other place of confinement is a "prisoner charged
with . . . a felony" who "escapes" within the meaning of
the statute.
[2] The legislative history of subdivision (b) and the
related provision of subdivillion (a)2 of section 4532 indicates
that section 4532 applies only to persons incarcerated in jails
and other institutions of collfinement who escape therefrom or
such persons who escape from the custody of those to whom
they have been entrusted while temporarily outside such
places of confinement.
The first escape statute was enacted in 1855 and applied
only to persons convicted and sentenced to the state prison
WllO escaped therefrom. (Stats. 1855, ch. 160, p. 203, § 1.) As
IThe entire subdivi~ion provided: "Every prisoner charged with or
convicted of a felony who is confined in any county or city jail or prison
or industrial farm or industrial road camp or who is engaged on any
county road or other county work or who is in the lawful custody of any
officcr or person, who escapes or attcmpts to escape from such county or
eity jail, prison, industrial farm or industria I road camp or from the
custody of any officcr or person in charge of him while engaged on or
going to or returning from such county work or from the custody of any
officer or person in whose lawfnl custody he is, is guilty of a felony and
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding 10 ycars,
or in the county jail not exceeding one year; provided, thot when said
second term of imprisonment is to he served in the county jail it shaH
commence frum t.hc timc su(·h prisollcr wonld otherwise have been dis·
(.harged from said jaiL"
2At thc time herc pel·lincnt, slIl"Jjvisiull (a) provided that "Every
prisoner formally charged with or convictcd of a mi.~demea?wr .•• who
Otereafter escapes . . . from thc cnstody of allY officer . . . in whose
lawful custody be is, is guilty of a felollY . . . • " (Italics added.) Except
for the italicized words, tire !'!'levllllt text of subdivision (a) is idcntical
with that of subdivision (b).
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enacted ill 1872, t.he PennI Cotl(~ hwliull'd t.hl'I'I' sl'c'l ions r(llnling to 011('111)(\, RII(It.itlllN lIIfi 111111 Hlfi """Jit'd III I'tll'lIllt'tj rl'lIlII
Nt~ll." ,I/';NUIIIII, IUlII 1II1111t.iull 1117, 11111 11I'11"lllllltltllII' III' til''' I 11111 II,il:',
IlJJJ,lIllu tu UIIOUlltl. troUl all uUlI!r 1,,·IIIUIIII./l "'/IPUf' Hf'f~I.iIJII"
appliod ol1ly to pricwJlorH confined in 0. prilJOll who olloapcu or
attempted to escape from the prison. Indeed, the Code Commissioners' notes defined the term "escape" to mean only an
escape from prison, i,e., as "the deliverance of a person who is
lawfully imprisoned, out of a prison." (Code Commissioners'
notes to section 105.) Since the requirement that the prisoner
be serving a sentence was not included in section 107, that
section applied to all prisoners in prisons other than state
prisons whether they had been convicted and sentenced or
were merely awaiting trial or other disposition. Section 107
did not apply to a person who had not yet been taken into a
... prison but who had merely escaped from the custody of an
arresting officer. Such conduct could be punished, however,
under section 148 of the Penal Code. (Resisting, delaying, or
obstructing an officer in the discharge of his duties. See also,
Stats. 1860, ch. 156, p. ,125, § 1.)
In 1923 section 107 !Was amended to include" every prisoner
charged with or convicted of a felony , . . who escapes . . .
from the lawful custody of any officer." Thus for the first
time the escape statute contained language that might be construed to apply to an arrestee's llight from the arresting officer. There are no committee reports setting forth the purpose
of the 1923 amendment. An examination of the amendment as
it passed through the Legislature makes it clear, however, that
the purpose of the amendment was not to enlarge the meaning
of the word "prisoner" to include persons who had been
arrested but not yet imprisoned, but to extend the coverage of
the section to prisoners incarcerated in facilities other than
prisons or who might be temporarily in custody outside the
walls of a custodial facility, and to make the offense a felony
instead of a misdemeanor.
The bill containing the amendment was entitled" An act to
3Seetion 105 provided: "Every prisoner confined in the State Prison
tor a term less than for life, who escapes therefrom is punishable by
imprisonment in the State Prison tor a term equal in length to the term
he was serving at the time of such escape."
Section 106 provided: "Every prisoner confined in the State Prison for
a term less than for life, who attempts to escape from such prison is
guilty ot a felony."
Section 107 provided: "Every prisoner confined in any other prison
than the State Prison who escapes or attempts to escape therefrom is
guilty of a misdemeanor, "
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ameuu s('dioll [107] of the Penal Coue relating to l'seapes and
attemph'd ('~('apes f!"Om N)Ullty jails, city jails, and f"om the
custody of the shcriJt while at. work on allY county road." It
provided: "Every prisoller confined in any jail or prison
other than the state prison, and every prisoner who is engaged on any county road or otJler county work, who escapes or
attempts to escape from sudl jailor other prison, or from the
custody of the sheriff while engaged on or going to or returning from such work is guilty of a felony." (A.B. No. 939,
introduced Peb. 1, 1923.) The Assembly retained the title but
amended the text to read: "Every prisoner charged with or
convicted of a felony who is confined in any jail or prison or
an inmate of any public training school or reformatory or
county hospital, or who is engaged on any county work or
who is in the lawful custody of any officer or person, who
escapes or attemptc; to escape from such jail, prison, public
training school, reformatory or county hospital, or from the
custody of the officer or person in charge of him while
engaged on or going t.o or returning from such county work or
from the custody of any officer or person in whose lawful
cU$tody he is, is guilty of a felony and is punishable as provided in [section 108]." (A.B. No. 939, as amended April 9,
1923.) After the Senate made a minor amendment, this bill
was enacted. (Stats. 1923, ch. 125, p. 270, § 1.)
Although section 107 as thus amended made clear for the
first time that any prisoner charged with or convicted of a
felollY who escaped from the lawful custody of any officer was
guilty of the offense whet.her or not the escape was from
witllin a custodial institution, it did 110t enlarge the definition
of prisoner to include a person who has been arrested but has
110t yet been incarcerated. Had the IJegislature intended to
include escapes from arresting officers, it would have been a
simple matter to amend the section to begin "Every person
arrested for, charged with or convicted of a felony. . . . "
Instead, its placement of the words "lawful custody of any
officer or person" and its placement of the reference to
escapes from "the custody of any officer or person in whose
lawful custody he is" at the conclusion of the other kinds of
custody and· escapes demonstrates concern with escapes of
those who had already been incarcerated. It was with respect
to such persons that the Legislature made clear that all custody outside the walls of the named custodial institutions was
included.
Substantially aU of section 107 was reenacted in 1941 as
section 4532 of the Penal Code. It is significant that this
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enactment was one of many undertaken by the Legislature
pursuant to a 1940 constitutional amendment (Cal. eOllst.,
art. X, § 7) that authorized the Legislature to create a statutory scheme for the management of pl'isons. 4 The language
here involved was transferred to the new section 4532, which
was included in new title 5 : "Offenses relating to Prisons and
Prisoners.' '5 Those parts of section 107 that dealt with
escapes from institutions other than prisons (e.g., reformatories, county hospitals) were left in section 107. Had the
Legislature intended the language in question to apply to
mere arrestees, it could easily have left that language in section 107 and changed the operative word therein from" prisoner" to "person" or placed that language in section 148 or
in an entirely new section. Since the language in question was
intended to refer to prisoners in custody while temporarily
outside the places of their confinement, it was appropriah·ly
included in the statutory scheme of prison management amI
control.
Since 1941 section 4532 has been frequently amended. 6
Only the 1961 amendment, however, which became effective
after petitioner's asserted escape, sheds any light on the question before us, and the cases interpreting earlier versions of
the statute are not helpful. Although some cases stressed the
basic statutory purpose of protecting the integrity of prisons
(In re Haines (1924) 68 Cal.App. 522, 526-527 [229 P. 984] ;
People v. Mackie (1929) 100 Cal.App. 292, 293 [279 1'. 8211 ;
People v. Serrano (1932) 123 Cal.App. 339 [11 P.2d 81 J ; see
In re Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605 [234 P. 883J)1 others
assumed that the statute applied at the moment a person was
4See, R. Kingsley, The Work Of the 1941 Legislature: Criminal Law
(1941) 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 31; S. Sefton, Code Sections on State Prisons
aM County Jails Revised and Codified (1941) 16 State Bar J. 274·27;;.
GAdded by Stats. 1941, eh. 106, pp. 1083, 1124, § 15.
6The section was amended in 1943, 1949, 1953, 1955, 1959, 19G1, 1963,
1965, and 1968. Section 4532 has constantly been before the Legislature.
Bills to amend this section have been offered in every legi~lative session
since 1941 with the exception of those in 1951, 1947, and 1945. Thirteen
amendments (not counting amendments to amellding bills) were offered
from 1941 to 1961, not one of whieh sought expressly to extend the
coverage of section 4532 to include the unlawful departure of :m arl'l'stec
prior to booking and incarceration.
7In People v, Serrano, sup"a, the court had to ueteJ"lllille wh(,ther a
person who had been arrested, booked on a charge of "suspieion of
forgery" and jailed was "charged" within the meaning of section 107.
In holding that he was, the court pointed out that it felt compelled to
interpret "charged" liberally because the defendant hall "l<'al"ly "cell
a prisoner who had escaped from a jail and that it was the booking :md
incarceration that made the section applicable. Thus, the court cmpha-
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lawfully arrested. (People v. Smillie (1942) 55 Oal.App.2d
381 [130 P.2d 714] ; People v. McConahay (1949) 90 Cal.App.
2d 596 [203 P.2d in1] ; People v. Segura (1955) 134 Cal.App.
2d 532 [286 P.2d 471] ; People v. Paul (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d
609 [305 P.2d 996] j People v. Valenzuela (1959) 171 Cal.
App.2d 331 [340 P.2d 685] j see also, People v. Torres (1957)
152 Cal.App.2d 636 [313 P.2d 197] j People v. Darnell·(1951)
107 Cal.App.2d 541, 546 [237 P.2d 525].)8 None of the cases,
however, discussed the question whether a person who had
been arrested but not yet booked or taken to a jail or prison
was a prisoner charged with a crime within the meaning of
section 4532.
In 1961 the Legislature amended section 4532 by deleting
the word "formally" from subdivision (a)1I and adding the
words "arrested and booked for" to both subdivisions (a)
and (b), s~ that the section now reads "Every prisoner
arrested and booked for, charged with, or convicted of a [misdemeanor (subdivision (a» or felony (subdivision (b»]
. . . . " In People v. Redmond (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 852, 861
[55 Cal.Rptr. 195], the court held that this amendment was
intended to clarify the meaning of the section and to indicate
"that the Legislature did not intend the word 'charged' to be
construed to extend to an arrest without a booking. "
Although the court mistakenly assumed that both subdivisions
had theretofore required that the prisoner be "formally
charged, " its error in this respect does not vitiate its conclusion. [3] We believe the amendment also supports our conclusion that the statute does not apply until an arrestee has
been booked preparatory to incarceration in a jailor other
place of confinement and thereby becomes a prisoner within
its meaning.
By fixing booking as the time at which an arrestee may
commit a felony by escaping, the Legislature has added precision to the requirement of incarceration that is implicit in the
term "prisoner;" The character of preincarceration custody
sized that the word" prisoner" was the principal operative word in the
section and that the entry in the jail recorda of the basis for the detention
was a sufficient" charge" to satisfy the statute. See, ta. at pp. 341, 342.
IlTo the extent that these cases are inconsistent with our conclusion
herein, they are disapproved.
IISee footnote 3, supra. In 1955 the Legislature increaaed the crime
of escape under subdivision (a) from II. misdemeanor to II. felony. (Stats.
1955, ch. 585, p. 1079, § 1.) Pursuant to that increaae, the following
italicized words were added to subdivision (a): "Every prisoner formally
charged .•. who thereafter escapes . • . . " (Ct. People v. Serrano,
supra (escape by prisoner booked and incarcerated but not yet formally
eharged).)
.
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in the field may be fraught with uncertainty and may range
from a temporary detention for investigation to an arrest for
an undefined or ill-defined erime to an arrest for a clearly
specified crime. [4] It was not unreasonable for the Legislature to conclude that section 148 10 of the Penal Code and
other statutes that protect officers in the performance of their
duties (see, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 243, 834a) are sufficient to cope
with the problem of escapes from arresting officers, and that
an arrestee who has not yet been incarcerated and who may
have done no more than walk away from all arresting offieer
should not be declared guilty of the felony of escape.
The writ is granted and the petitioner is discharged from
custody.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J.,
concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would deny the petition for the
reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Bray in the opmlon prepared by him for the Court of Appcal in In re Culver (Cal.
App.) 68 Cal.Rptr. 544.
10The history of section 148 parallels that of section 4532. Stats. 1860,
ch. 156, p. 125, § 1 declared it to be a crime to resist, obstruct, or oppost!
an officer attempting to make, or making, an arrest. Section 148 was
included in the Penal Code of 1872 and its principal language, an expanded version of the 1860 statute, has remained unchanged since:
"Every person who willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public officer
in the discharge [of] any duty of his office . . • is punishable. . . . "
(Pen. Code, § 148; italics added.) Section 148 applies to one who flees
from an arresting officer after the arrest has been made. See People v.
Wilscm (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 738, 743 [37 Cal.Rptr. 42], wherein the
court held that one who fled from an officer after arrest and then pro·
cured a gun with which he held the officer at bay had violated section 148
before he obtained the gun. Wilson was disapproved on other grounds in
Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 CaI.2d 822, 827 [48 Cal.Rptr. 366,
409 P.2d 206], but the court in Kellett nonetheless agreed that the flight
from the officer constituted a separate offense from the procurement and
threatened use of the gun. See also People v. Derby (1960) 177 Cal.
App.2d 626 [2 Cal.Rptr. 401] (struggle, flight). Although most cases,
like the instant case, involve a struggle prior to the flight, thc use of
force is not an element in the violation of section 148. See In re Bacon
(1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34,51·55 [49 CaI.Rptr. 322].

